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Abstract—In this paper we present ECDP, an efficient incentive
based prioritized content distribution protocol. In ECDP content
which originates from some servers or peers is first distributed to
some users (peers). As soon as the content reaches some of these
peers, other peers can get the content either from the servers or
any of the peers whichever gives the lowest per packet price and
highest throughput.
An ECDP content information manager (CIM ) calculates the
weighted (prioritized) fair rate for each stream at each node.
To do this the CIM first obtains the upload and download base
rates from each peer’s rate monitor (PA). A peer selects or looks
up a content in the CIM database using a web interface. The
CIM selects a content source node (CDN server or peer) which
gives the lowest (bandwidth) price, highest rate (throughput) and
lowest delay for each requesting peer.
In ECDP, each content source periodically adjusts its band-
width prices and prioritized rates based on the current demand.
Unlike existing incentive-based mechanisms, ECDP enforces the
rate allocations by setting the flows’ sending rates (congestion
window, receive window and maximum window sizes) to ensure
efficient and accurate incentive to the participating nodes.
We have implemented ECDP in the NS2 simulator. Simulation
results show that ECDP can outperform existing schemes in
terms of file download time and throughput. The results also
demonstrate that ECDP obtains fair uplink prices for the up-
loaders and fair cost for the downloaders maintaining an overall
system fairness to benefit all peers, content providers and network
operators. The results also demonstrate that ECDP efficiently
enforces the prioritized allocations. ECDP can be deployed in
the current Internet without the need of changes to the TCP/IP
stack or routers. We have also implemented ECDP using an
Apache SQL Server with PHP in Linux virtual machines and
demonstrated that ECDP is a scalable protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the fast growth of the Internet and networking tech-
nologies, there has been an explosive growth of online content
[1], [2]. These online contents are generated either by central-
ized content providers (Comcast, Amazon, etc) or distributed
users (Youtube, Facebook, etc). Such content generation is ex-
pected to grow even more (40-45% a year) [2] with the further
expansion and sophistication of the Internet and networking
technologies. The content can be none real-time ordinary static
file (OSC), a realtime 2-dimensional (2D) streaming video
content like YouTube video or a 3 dimensional (3D) streaming
content [3].
Traditionally, centralized content providers (CCP) use con-
tent distribution networks (CDN) to distribute their contents
to their customers. CDNs may use their own network as
the case of Comcast and Google [2] or they can use other
operator networks to distribute the content. Distributed user
generated contents (UGC) such as YouTube and Facebook
contents are stored in central Google and Facebook servers and
then distributed using the respective CDNs. In the UGC case,
once users upload their contents to Youtube, Facebook and
other similar services, they lose full control of their contents.
On the other hand, such companies (Google and Facebook)
generate revenues from paid advertisements using the UGC
making it inconvenient for users to share contents. Besides,
as users view content from such centralized company servers,
their privacies are compromised when personal information is
shared with third-party websites. These trends of privacy issues
and lack of content ownership demand new architectures for
content sharing.
As discussed in [4] it is feasible for users to own their
contents and share it with others directly from their home.
There are newly emerging distributed social network tech-
nologies such as the Diaspora (social network) [5], [6] to
achieve the goal content ownership and privacy. The Diaspora
social network consists a network of nodes or pods. Each
node is hosted by many different individuals and institutions.
Users (peers) can host their data with a traditional web host,
a cloud-based host, an ISP, or a friend. Users (peers) create
accounts on any server and can exchange data with users in
other servers. Using such distributed networks of peers both
UGC and contents by CCP can be shared.
Using cooperative distributed peers has long been used to
distribute content over the Internet. In the year 2007 about
30-40% of of Internet traffic was peer-to-peer (P2P) traffic
with BitTorrent claiming most of it [1]. As discussed in
[1] P2P traffic is growing within access networks after a
global decline in the last two years. Besides, the volume
of video content is increasing. With the increase in high
bandwidth content demands, content providers should either
over-provision their bandwidth to handle peak demands or rely
on purchased service such as Akamai. However as discussed in
[8] it is cheaper for content providers to purchase bandwidth
from their users than using third party content distribution
networks (CDNs) or purchasing the infrastructure to directly
serve contents. Besides assisting CDNs, using P2P networks
results in significant scalability gains as discussed in [9], [10].
While using cooperative customer peers to distribute con-
tent, providers need to be mindful about incentives to pay back
peers for their upload bandwidth. Besides, content providers
need to make sure that the incentives and returns are accurate
enough to offer better quality of service (QoS) guarantees.
Using an efficient, fair and accurate peer incentive mechanism
can also benefit content providers and network operators
significantly. Content providers can save on bandwidth cost by
buying peer link bandwidth. Besides, peers who get significant
credit (financial or content credit) from uploading content are
most likely to subscribe to more contents potentially increasing
the content demand. More content demand can also translate
into more link bandwidth demand which can benefit network
operators.
BitTorrent [11] and its variants [12], [13] prevent free riding
by using a Tit-for-Tat (TFT) incentive mechanism. However
in these systems two users are incentivized to exchange only
if each has content the other wants as also explained in
[14]. Price-Assisted Content Exchange (PACE) [15], [14] and
Dandelion [8], [16] are other price-based-content exchange
schemes. In Dandelion the content provider rewards uploaders
with a fixed credit value for uploading a chunk of a content.
Downloaders spend a fixed amount of credit units for each
chunk they download. Dandelion doesn’t consider a dynamic
bandwidth price as a function of content demand and resource
(uplink bandwidth) supply. On the other hand PACE obtains
per uplink prices based on total demand for each file (content)
and supply (uplink capacity). However, in PACE demand may
be overestimated, as a buy client can issue several sequential
requests to different sell clients until a successful download
[15]. Hence, PACE does not guarantee fair-exchange of con-
tent for payment. Besides in PACE only the price is considered
to choose an uploader (server) of a content regardless of
whether or not there are other uploaders which can offer a
higher rate (throughput). Both PACE and Dandelion do not
provide a mechanism where end-to-end rates are allocated and
enforced to all flows of the systems efficiently. They also do
not consider prioritized rate allocation where some content
requests have a minimum rate requirement.
In this paper we present an Efficient Content Distribution
Protocol (ECDP) based on accurate, fair and efficient peer
incentives. ECDP helps distributed peers exchange content
which can be OSC, 2D or 3D data. ECDP consists of 3 main
logical components namely content index manager (CIM),
prioritized max/min rate allocation (PRA) and bandwidth and
content pricing (BCP). These components interact with each
other. The CIM consists of databases with information of
peers and data contents. The PRA component is done with the
help of the CIM and distributed peer agents (PA). It is where
prioritized rate is calculated for each upload and download link
of the peers and other main content servers. The rates are then
used to choose a content source and to set the sending rates
of the corresponding flows. BCP which is also done by the
CIM and PA is a component where the bandwidth and content
prices are calculated adaptively to ensure incentives between
the participating peers. Peers which upload more, earn more
credit which can be of monetary value or in terms of download
bandwidth or content discounting.
In ECDP each participating peer has an incentive to actively
maintain and upload contents to other peers. The best price
and transfer strategy for each peer is moderated by software
components called content information managers (CIM ) along
with peer agents (PA). In ECDP each peer which wants
to participate in the ECDP automatic fair trading installs
an associated PA. Each PA then sends its peer’s settings
to its CIM. The peer settings include the up and downlink
capacities of the peer, policy preferences, and ID of the
content of interest. The CIM first makes authentication and
registration of the requesting peer. The content source chooses
between monetary incentive and bandwidth incentive modes
while registering. The monetary incentive mode allows peers
to earn monetary credit for their upload capacities used and
pay in monetary amounts for the download bandwidth of
other content source they download content from. In the
bandwidth incentive mode the monetary credit of peers is
converted into higher upload bandwidth values from the con-
tent sources. A monetary amount to pay of such peers is also
converted into the corresponding upload bandwidth reduction
from their content sources. In the monetary incentive mode,
the registered peer maintains paid accounts with the content
information manager (CIM) which communicates with the
content providers. In this mode, the price we use in ECDP
is directly mapped to real monetary value. This real currency
approach eliminates the credit depletion issues [15]. For paid
contents, the price of the content is added to the bandwidth
prices. The CIM then makes initial calculation of the up and
down link rates and prices of each peer based on the current
demands (requests) and updates its content index database
(CID). After this, the CIM selects the best content source
(uploader) for the requesting peer, based on the content source
selection policy which the requesting peer chooses. The CIM
informs both the selected content source (uploading peer) and
the receiving (downloading) peer of the match along with the
uplink and downlink rates.
The source of the content then uploads the content to the
destination at the rate which is the minimum of the uplink and
downlink rates. The source peer sets its congestion window
(maximum congestion window) to the product of its round
trip time (RTT) and the minimum of the uplink and downlink
rates it obtained from its CIM. Or simply the uploader sets its
congestion window or maximum congestion window to the
product of its upload rate and RTT. The downloader sets its
receive window to the product of its downlink rate and its
RTT.
The PA of the uploader also updates its total amount to
earn from the upload every control interval. The PA of the
downloader periodically checks the amount it has to pay along
with the rate at which it is downloading a content. If there is
any discrepancy in the download rate either because of some
unexpected bottleneck link in the core network or because
the uploader is cheating, the PA on the content receiving end
sends new rate values to its CIM. The CIM then informs the
uploading PA of the new effective rate. The price calculation
algorithm is simple and difficult to cheat. In ECDP both
uploaders and downloaders have no incentives to cheat. The
uploader losses customers and hence money (or download
bandwidth) if it cheats and the downloader losses a cheap
and high throughput source if it cheats as each uploader also
has the right to disagree (and drop a customer) by informing
the CIM. If a source claims to have a higher rate than it
has, its bandwidth price decreases accordingly and congests
itself. The congestion can also result in flows taking longer to
finish keeping the misbehaving source busy at a low bandwidth
for longer than necessary. If flows do not finish quickly, the
uploader does not get its credit quickly. Moreover, the CIM
monitors all the values making it difficult for either content
source or destination to misbehave.
ECDP can also be a network operator centric approach
where operators and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can
use it to efficiently distribute content and avoid congestion.
As every requester is checking and paying for the content it
requests, ECDP inherently mitigates Denial of Service Attacks
(DoS). In the operator-centric ECDP scheme, there is a CIM
associated with each bottleneck link forming a hierarchy of
CIMs. At the lowest level of the hierarchy, there are the PAs
and then the second level CIMs, and continues to the highest
level CIMs. The operator CIM can then choose local uploaders
or global uploaders based on its policies.
Unlike previous work [15],[8], the design of ECDP can
allocate rates for different content requests using priorities
based on their minimum rate requirements. ECDP can also
limit the lifetime of the content to a user-defined parameter.
These features are specially important for 2D and 3D live
streaming contents which have real time requirements. For
instance, to render a 3D video, streams should be synchronized
and rendered within a short time gap between them.
We have implemented ECDP in the NS2 [17] simulator and
using an Apache SQL server with PHP in Linux virtual ma-
chines. The NS2 simulator is so robust that descriptions of the
streams of the 3D content can be taken as inputs to produce an
emulated 3D video as output. The simulation results show how
ECDP can outperform existing content distribution schemes in
terms of download time and throughput. The numerical results
also demonstrate that the different components of ECDP work
according to the design. The SQL implementation of ECDP
using PHP shows that ECDP can scale to millions of peers
and contents.
The main contributions of this work are as follows.
• We have designed an efficient content distribution pro-
tocol (ECDP) with efficient cross-layer content source
selection and congestion control mechanisms.
• We have shown that ECDP provides accurate and efficient
incentive mechanisms to benefit content providers, con-
tent users and network operators. The incentive is in real
monetary values (monetary incentive mode) and can also
be translated into download rate (bandwidth incentive
mode).
• We have implemented ECDP in the NS2 simulator,
evaluated the performance of ECDP, showing that it can
outperform existing schemes.
• We have experimented with ECDP using Apache SQL
server, and have shown how ECDP scales.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II
we present the general ECDP architecture. In section III
we present the methods ECDP uses to calculate the rates
and prices. ECDP content source selection mechanisms are
presented in section IV. In section V we present the content
index management component of ECDP. In section VI we
show how ECDP content index management scales with the
growth of the number of content records. Sections VII and
VIII present the schemes ECDP uses to enforce the rate
allocations and bandwidth prices without having to change
the TCP/IP stack and packet header formats. The summary of
the ECDP algorithm is discussed in section IX. We discuss
ECDP deployment scenarios in section X. We evaluate the
performance of ECDP in section XI. Analysis of related work
is given in section XII. Finally we give conclusion of the paper
in section XIII.
II. GENERAL ECDP ARCHITECTURE
In this section we give a description of the general ECDP
architecture starting with the network and content (data) mod-
els.
A. Network and Content Model
The network model of ECDP consists of a graph G =
(N,E) of nodes N and edges E as shown in figure 2. The
node set V consists of the CDN servers which provide content
and the peers which provide and/or request for content. The
edge set E consists of all edges going to and from the nodes.
All nodes are linked with each other over the Internet which
may consist of multiple backbone networks. Each node has
link with specified upload and download capacities it buys
(gets) from network operators. The operator backbone network
usually has enough bandwidth to provide bandwidth guarantee
to the users (nodes). This is usually done using protocols such
as the OSPFv3 as a Provider Edge to Customer Edge (PE-CE)
Routing Protocol [18].
The ECDP data model consists of content which is sent from
the CDN servers or from some peers and exchanged between
the peer nodes. We classify the data (contents) into none real-
time ordinary static file (OSC), a realtime (live and none-live)
streaming video content like 2-dimensional (2D) YouTube or
a 3-dimensional (3D) video content [3]. The 3D Tele-Imersive
content involves multiple streams from different view angles
which have to be synchronized by the receiving end to produce
a 3D multi-view streaming video. To synchronize the contents,
ECDP uses content lifetime threshold based on how long a
receiving node can buffer. For a stringent 3D Tele-Imersive
environment, where the peers have to produce interactive
content, the content lifetime becomes very small to ensure
a very small delay. For most cases where nodes view the 3D
content, the content life time can be relaxed.
B. Logical and Physical Architectures
The ECDP architecture aims to efficiently distribute con-
tent to network peers benefiting all content actors (content
providers, content users and network operators). As shown in
figure 1, it consists of a content information (index) manager
(CIM) and peer agent (PA). A CIM chooses content source to
the requesting peers and a PA connects a peer with the CIM.
The CIM is made up of the light weight front end server (FES),
content information database (CID), the complaint manager
(CM) and the archive manager (AM). The CID consists
of a database of contents information such as the source
peers, source upload rates. The CM manages reports about
misbehaving peers. The AM manages old content information
and transaction logs to perform offline content index analysis.
The FES forwards requests to register a new peer, a new
content, or requests for a content to the respective CID tables
as discussed in the section V. The FES also forwards peer
complaints to the CM. The CM contacts the AM for complaint
history. The CID archives old content information at the AM.
PAPA
AM
CM
CID
FES
. . . PA
CIM
Fig. 1. The ECDP Logical Architecture
The ECDP physical architecture can be described by fig-
ure 2. The architecture consists of the peer nodes with their PA,
the CIM and a big content source peer connected to its CDN
with a bigger link. The big content source sends its content
to the content distribution network (CDN) which informs the
CIM of the new content. The content source which can be any
peer with a PA can also inform the CIM of its content directly.
The other peer nodes can then send a content request to the
content information manager (CIM ) via their peer agent (PA).
The peers can get the content either from the CDN or other
peers whichever gives the highest throughput to price ratio as
discussed in the next section IV.
Hence, ECDP consists of three logical components namely,
prioritized max/min rate allocation, bandwidth and content
pricing and content index management. These components are
also shown in figure 3 and discussed in the introduction sec-
tion I. We show how the CIM and PA perform the prioritized
rate allocation and bandwidth pricing in the next section.
Primergy
CDN
PA
PA
PAPA
PA
PA
CIM
PA
Internet
Big Content
Source Peer
Fig. 2. The ECDP Architecture
Prioritized Max/Min 
Rate Allocation
Content Index
Manager Content Pricing
Bandwidth and
Fig. 3. ECDP Logical Components
III. ECDP RATE AND PRICE CALCULATION
To obtain the rates at which each content is transmitted
from one node to another node and the bandwidth usage price,
ECDP first carries out temporary rate and price calculations
at the CIM at every request or at every control interval τ . The
rates and prices are then sent to the PAs, updated by the PA
and sent back to the CIM. The CIM then uses these rate and
price values to select a content source (peer or CDN server)
and determine the rate at which content is transmitted.
To define the ECDP rate and price metrics, we first present
the following notations in table I.
For each ECDP parameter X ∈
{R,C,Q, Nˆ ,N, nj , Rj ,M j , p, ℘j}, we use the notation,
Xd,u =
{
Xd if X is a downlink ECDP parameter,
Xu if X is a uplink ECDP parameter.
(1)
We next give short descriptions of the ECDP parameters.
A. Calculations At CIM
Whenever a node sends a request for a content to the CIM,
the CIM does the following.
• Selects the best content source for the requesting peer
node based on the content source selection policy dis-
cussed in section IV.
TABLE I
ECDP PARAMETERS
Variables Description
Cd,u Link capacity
τ Control interval
Rd,u(t) Base link rate allocation of the current interval (round)
Nd,u(t) Number of flows in the link during the current round
R
j
d,u
(t) Link rate allocation of flow j for the current round
M
j
d,u
Minimum rate requirement of content flow j
pd,u(t) Per packet price
℘
j
d,u
Priority weight of flow (stream or chunk) j
• Subtracts M iu of request i of the requesting peer from
the remaining uplink capacity of the content source and
M id from the remaining downlink capacity of destination
peer to reserve a minimum bandwidth requirement for the
requesting peer. This involves only a single subtraction
operation. This remaining capacity is used in equation 2
of the rate calculation. If either of the remaining band-
widths is negative, the CIM informs the requesting peer
that its request cannot be fulfilled.
• Increments the flow priority weight sum used in equa-
tion 2. This involves one addition instruction. The flow
priorities are globally known to the CIM or specified by
each requesting peer. The PA and the CIM then calculate
the corresponding weights of the priorities.
• Updates the base uplink (u) and downlink (d) rates and
prices of the affected peers, using equations 2 and 4 with
two division instructions each.
• After accumulating the remaining bandwidth values and
the sum of the priorities used in equation 2, the calcula-
tions of the base rate using equation 2 and price values
using equation 4 can be done periodically to further
reduce more computational overhead.
• Sends the ID (address) of the selected content source and
the uplink rate value Ru(t) from the selected source to
the PA of the requesting node.
• Sends the ID of the requesting node and the downlink
rate Rd(t) to the PA of the selected source.
The PA then performs the tasks discussed in section III-B.
• At the CIM when the flow of the requesting peer finishes
(downloading the content), the remaining uplink band-
width of the content source and the remaining downlink
bandwidth of the receiving peer are increased by the
minimum rate requirement of the flow which finished
and the priority respective weights sums decrease by the
priority weight of the flow which finished.
• The total amount E¨ of credit, the content source earns,
and the total amount P¨ , the receiving peer pays, each
increases by the contentSize × pd,u(t).
• The base rate and price values are then updated accord-
ingly using equations 2 and 4.
The temporary down-link (d) and up-link (u) rates of every
node (peer or CDN server) are calculated by the CIM as
Rd,u(t) =
Cd,u −
∑Nd,u
j M
j
d,u∑Nd,u
j ℘
j
d,u
(2)
where the notations are described in table I and ℘jd,u is the
priority weight of request j. If all requests have the same
priority,
∑Nd,u
j ℘
j
d,u = Nd,u.
The temporary uplink and downlink rates Riu and Rid of
flow i are given by
Rid,u =M
i
d,u + ℘
iRd,u(t). (3)
The temporary per packet prices for the uplink (u) and
downlink (d) are calculated as
pd,u(t) =
pd,u(t− d)×Rd,u(t− τ)
Rd,u(t)
(4)
where the notations are also described in table I.
When a request for content is made, the temporary rate
and price calculations ensure that the CIM does not result in
assigning requests to peers they do not have enough resources
for, leaving the refined distributed rate and price calculations
to the peers as shown in section III-B below.
B. Calculations At PA
When the CIM assigns stream requests to nodes selected by
a content source selection algorithm discussed in section IV,
it also sends the new rate values obtained by equation 2
to the content source and destination PAs as discussed in
section III-A.
When a PA receives the rates Rd,u of its uplink and
downlink flows from its CIM, it performs the following.
• Uses the uplink and downlink rate values of each of the
flows of its node received from its CIM to obtain the
effective flow count for all uplink and downlink flows of
its node using equations 6 and 5.
• Calculates a new rate value using the effective flow count
as given by equation 7. This new rate ensures that a
capacity unused by some flows is being used by other
flows making ECDP an max-min fair algorithm. This is
because some uplink flows may be bottlenecked at the
downlink and vice-versa.
• Calculates the new price value based on the new rate
values using equation 4.
• Sends the new base rate values obtained using equation 7
back to the CIM. The new price values can also be sent
to the CIM saving the CIM some computational costs.
The CIM then calculates its new price values and uses
both the new rate and price values to select content
sources (peers or CDN servers) for each request for
content.
• Calculates the new rate Rid,u values of each of its uplink
and downlink flows (streams) i using equation 8.
• Enforces this rate allocation using schemes discussed in
section VII.
With the temporary uplink rate of a flow k from a content
source as Rku and the temporary downlink rate of the flow
to the destination by Rkd both obtained using equation 3, if
Rku > R
k
d , then the content source of flow k should not send
at the rate of Rku for flow k as it is bottlenecked in the last
link to the destination. On the other hand if Rku < Rkd , the
destination node cannot receive (download) at the rate of Rkd
for the flow k. In these cases, other flows sharing the links
with flow k should be able to use the corresponding uplink or
downlink bandwidth unused by flow k to ensure that ECDP is
max-min fair. To do this, we previously introduced a concept,
called fractional flow [19], where some flows which cannot
use the bandwidth allocated to them are counted as partial
flows or fraction of a flow. We call such a count of a flow an
effective flow count. The effective flow count of flow k at the
source node is given by
nku =
{
Rku
Rk
d
if Rkd > Rku,
1 otherwise.
(5)
The effective flow count of flow k at the destination node
is given by
nkd =
{
Rkd
Rku
if Rku > Rkd ,
1 otherwise.
(6)
Each PA then obtains new uplink and downlink base rate
values as
Rd,u(t) =
Cd,u −
∑Nd,u
j M
j
d,u∑Nd,u
j ℘
j
d,un
j
d,u
. (7)
The new per packet prices for the uplink and downlink of
a node are then obtained using equation 4.
Besides, a node resets the up and downlink rates of its’ flow
i as
Rid,u =M
i
d,u + n
i
d,u℘
iRd,u(t). (8)
Equivalently, the uplink rate Riu of the flow i at a node can
also be calculated as
Riu =M
i
u + n
i
u℘
iRu(t). (9)
If there is a CIM which knows every request for content
and every end of a flow, then equations 6, 5, 7 and 4 can also
be calculated using the CIM itself. However, in the case of
different CIMs being responsible to different groups of nodes
for instance based on locality, then the content source selection
by one CIM at a given level of the CIM hierarchy may not
be known to other CIMs. In this case the new rate and price
values should be obtained by the PA of each node.
C. Incentives in Free Content Delivery
ECDP can also operate under a free content delivery mode,
where the monetary amounts to be earned and paid can be
converted into downlink bandwidth incentives as follows.
• First, a requesting peer sends its current base downlink
rate Rd(t) along with the other fields to the CIM.
• The CIM then selects a content source with a base upload
rate of Ru(t) to the requested content based on the
specified policy.
• The CIM informs the content source to rate-limit the
requesting peer at a base rate of
R¨ = w¨(E¨, P¨ )×min(Rd(t), Ru(t))
where w¨(E¨, P¨ ) is the weight function of the total mon-
etary amount E¨ the requesting peer has earned and the
total amount P¨ the peer has to pay. The min is a minimum
function. In this study we set
w¨(E¨, P¨ ) =
E¨
P¨
. (10)
Other pricing and weight functions can also be used in
ECDP.
• The new weights ℘˜ju of every request j from the request-
ing peer is then set as ℘˜ju = ℘juw¨(E¨, P¨ ). This new weight
is the product of the peer weight, w¨(E¨, P¨ ), and the flow
(stream) priority weight, ℘ju.
• CIM obtains the rate allocation of the request j made by
the peer as R¨j =M ju + ℘˜juR¨.
• CIM also estimates the content transfer duration of the
flow of request j as estContentDuration = contentSize
R¨j
where contentSize is given in the tblRequestedContent of
the CID. This makes sure that the content source losses
bandwidth credit if it does not enforce the rate limit
request by the CIM and gives higher rate to the requesting
peer.
D. Content Lifetime
When a content is produced by a source node, the source
attaches the creation timestamp. The CIM maintains a content
lifetime threshold Ψ. For realtime applications such as 2D and
3D streaming which are sensitive to content lifetime, Ψ is set
to the desired value. In our experiments for viewers of 3D
streaming [3], we set Ψ = 2.5 sec. For interactive realtime
applications, Ψ can be to a much smaller value. Each node
in ECDP can also maintain its own value of Ψ based on its
storage and downlink capacities. If the Ψ of a content expires,
the CIM puts the content information to its AM. The CIM
continues to find sources with a fresh (streaming) content for
requests.
Each node which requests for a content maintains a buffer
worth at least Ψ˜ = Ψ + RTT seconds for each content flow
it requests where RTT is the estimate of the round trip time
of the flow (stream). This is specially useful if a peer has
to perform 3D display of contents. In this case to maintain
synchronization between frames of different streams (flows),
a node keeps a buffer worth Ψ˜ of early arriving frames of
each flow. The longest a node waits before it renders streams
is then Ψ˜. In the results reported in this paper we have used
the hop count field with the maximum RTT value of 500 ms
per hop to estimate the Ψ for the streaming experiments.
E. ECDP is TCP friendly
Theorem 1: An ECDP rate allocation of a flow which is not
bottlenecked at a link l is TCP friendly to all flows sharing
link l.
Proof: If a flow i is not bottlenecked at link l, it cannot
congest link l regardless how much its sending rate increases.
This is because the flow i has another bottleneck which limits
its sending rate. This in turn means that TCP flows sharing
link l with flow i have enough bandwidth at link l to use.
This implies that TCP fairness is not an issue at link l and
flow i is TCP friendly.
Even though ECDP handles scenarios where the bottleneck
link can be somewhere in the backbone network, the bottle-
neck link in the ECDP architecture is usually going to be at the
last mile links to and from the peers. This is because (1) users
(peers) usually buy a guaranteed bandwidth and (2) the peers
which can use a specific peer as a source of their content
are usually scattered over a wide area each using different
paths in the backbone network. Hence, if the ECDP flows
are not bottlenecked at a link which they share with TCP,
then they are TCP friendly based on the above theorem 1.
In a scenario where the bottleneck link is in the backbone
network, the ECDP flows will drop or delay packets. This
congestion signal can be detected by the PA of each peer
which counts the number of successfully transmitted packets.
The PA compares this count over a time interval against the
minimum of the uplink and downlink rates of the flow. If the
PA finds that the backbone network is congested, it uses the
maximum congestion window and receive window to enforce
the rate allocations as discussed in section VII.
F. When a Flow Ends
When a peer wants to end a flow (stream) due to for
instance 3D view change, the node sends the contentID of
the flow (stream) it needs to end. The CIM then finds the
corresponding global contentID in its content table, removes
the contentID and releases the associated resources. It then
updates the corresponding content source and destination rate
and price values. The CIM also finds a new content source
to all other peers which are actively downloading the content
from the peer which wants to end it. Here, the CIM uses the
original content source as the new content source for the peers
which are using the content whose source is ending it. This is
because if a new peer (which is not the original content source)
is chosen to be the new source of the content, it is difficult to
find (trace) out whether one of the parents (ancestors) of this
chosen peer is the peer which is ending the content or not.
After a peer completes downloading a (non-streaming) con-
tent, it requests for the decryption key. The CIM then updates
the rate calculations of the content source and destination
based on the equations in sections III-A and III-B.
In this section, we have been discussing how the CIM and
PA perform the rate allocation and bandwidth calculations
in a TCP friendly manner. In the next section we discuss
mechanisms which the CIM with the assistance of the PAs
uses to select a content source for a requesting peer.
IV. CONTENT SOURCE SELECTION
Once the CIM receives the new rate values from each PA, it
obtains the new price values using equation 4. Then any of the
following policies can be used for selecting a content source
for the requesting nodes. The source can be another peer node
or a CDN node.
A. Highest Rate to Price Ratio Policy (HRPR)
In this HRPR policy, the CIM keeps the ratio
Kd,u(t) = Rd,u(t)/pd,u(t) (11)
of the rates to their respective prices in its peer table as shown
in section V-A1. When a node requests for a content, the CIM
chooses a content source which gives the highest value of
Kd,u(t). This approach enables the CIM to choose a node
which gives the highest rate with the lowest price. In the
analysis of this paper we use this content source selection
strategy.
B. Highest Rate Policy
In this policy the CIM selects a content source which
provides the highest rate to each node irrespective of the price.
So a node which is allowed to download from a content source
with the highest rate pays the corresponding price. The nodes
can also earn credit by allowing other nodes to download from
them and then get a service whose price is equivalent to the
credit they have earned as discussed in section III-C.
C. Best Rate Fit Policy
When a node requests the CIM for a content, the CIM can
also choose a content source whose upload rate is the smallest
value greater than the download rate of the requesting node.
This approach allows the CIM to do a best fit allocation to
allow big upload requests.
D. Smallest Price Policy
If a node which requests for a content doesn’t want to
pay more or doesn’t want to spend more of its credit, it can
request a smallest price policy. In this case, the CIM chooses a
content source with an upload value of at least as much as the
minimum required rate for the content and with the smallest
price.
E. Lowest Latency (Local Network) Policy
A user’s request may have some latency constraints. In this
case a user may request a node with the shortest latency. To
deal with this scenario, we group peers with similar IP prefixes
together. This can be done by hashing the most-significant
bit-group in the IP address of the content request packets of
the registering peers. We can then have one CIM responsible
for each group of users (peer nodes) forming a hierarchical
structure of content information managers as shown in figure 4.
This policy can have a significant advantage in reducing
backbone network link congestion as many requests can be
served locally. This is another benefit to network operators.
Besides, users in the same geographical location may tend to
have interest to the same content making it easy for the content
source selection algorithm to decide.
To use this policy, users send a request to the FES of the
CIM which then hashes the requester’s IP prefix values and
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Fig. 4. The ECDP Architecture
forwards them to their respective CID tables. This approach
also allows ECDP to scale as discussed in section VI.
F. Small Content Lifetime (Hop Count) Policy
The peers in the ECDP have a strong incentive to store
and share the contents they download. As every upload can
result in credit which can translate to monetary rewards or
high download rate. A node can also inform the content index
manager (CIM) that it does not want to serve a specific content.
Besides, a peer which has big enough buffer can store early
arriving streams to create a 3D tele-Imersive [20] view along
with other streams which arrive late. In a scenario where a
significant number of peers have limited buffer, ECDP can
either use a small content lifetime as discussed in III-D or
follow a small content lifetime policy. In this policy, the CIM
uses a content hop count field in its content index database
(CID) along with locality information. Here a content source
with the lowest hop count is selected to serve the requesting
peers. The CIM first tries to find such content in the local CID.
If the content with the desired hop count cannot be found in the
local CID, it is searched in the master tblSelectedSource table
as shown in section VI-A. If such content with the desired
hop count cannot be found, the default highest rate to price
ratio policy discussed in section IV-A is used.
G. Private Group Policy
This ECDP policy allows content to be shared within a
specific group of peers which can be social or organizational
groups. Each private group can form its own CIM with any
of the above server selection policies. This can enable ECDP
to deploy Facebook like applications such as the Diaspora [5],
[6]. A distributed network of CIMs can also be formed where
CIMs exchange public content information based on privacy
settings in an adhoc or hierarchical manner. Any peer can then
subscribe to different CIMs for different contents forming a
distributed content networking.
So far we have been discussing the two major components
of ECDP which deal with the prioritized rate allocation and
resource pricing. After presenting mechanisms of how the
uplink and downlink rates for each peer and the corresponding
bandwidth prices are calculated by the CIM and PA we have
also discussed how the CIM uses these metrics to select a
content source for a requesting peer. We next present an
efficient content index management scheme which the CIM
uses to select the best content source for a requesting peer.
V. CONTENT INDEX MANAGEMENT
In ECDP some peers or content providers provide content
by registering their content information at the content index
manager (CIM). Other peers request the CIM for a specific
content. In this section we show how such contents are
registered, requested and their source selected.
A. Content Index Database
The registered content information is stored at the content
index database (CID) which is part of the CIM system. The
CID consists of the tblPeer, tblContent, tblSelectedSource,
tblRequestedContent tables as shown in figure 5. The tblPeer-
Content table is used to link the tblPeer and tblContent in a
many-to-many relationship.
contentID
peerID
contentUrl
contentKey
contentHopCount
tblPeerContent tblContent
contentID
contentDescription
contentSize
contentHash
contentPopularity
tblSelectedSource
contentPopularity
contentHopCount
contentDescription
contentID
contentUrl
peerURate
peerPrice
peerRatePPrice
peerID
tblPeer
peerURate
peerPrice
peerRatePPrice
peerInfo
totalAmountToPay
totalAmountToEarn
peerID
1
contentID
contentDstID
contentSize
contentSrcID
requestTime
contentHash
contentOldKey
contentKey
amountToPay
tblRequestedContent
dlRate
1
∞
∞ ∞
∞
∞
1
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1) Peer Table: The tblPeer contains the fields described
in table II. Initial content providers need to fill in all the
fields of this table. The peerInfo contains real content provider
information such as telephone number, address and/or credit
card number. Such confirmed information holds each content
provider accountable for the nature of the content provided.
The peerInfo field is also used by the content providers to
charge peers for none-free contents. Once a peer receives a
content, the CID registers the peer as having the content unless
the peer indicates that it does not want to serve the content.
The peers which are not the original sources of the content do
not have to provide their peerInfo unless they want to receive
monetary value of the credit they earn. The peerID field is
the primary key of the tblPeer. It is preferred to be the IP
address of the peer. The peers have incentives to provide their
correct IP addresses. This is because if a peer gives a wrong IP
address, it can not get a content as a source sends its content
to an IP address it obtains from the CIM.
TABLE II
PEER TABLE FIELDS
Field name Description
peerID Unique peer identifier
peerURate Current base uplink rate, Ru(t) of a peer calculated
using equation 2
peerPrice Per unit uplink cost of a peer node
peerRatePPrice Peer rate per price calculated using equation 11
peerInfo Real content provider information
totalAmountToPay Total monetary amount a peer needs to pay for down-
loading a content
totalAmountToEarn Total monetary amount a peer earns for uploading a
content
If the peer is just joining the CIM, its uplink rate, peerU-
Rate, is the the total uplink capacity it uses to earn credit
from other peers to which it uploads content. The peer has
an incentive to dedicate more uplink capacity, as more uplink
capacity can bring the peer more credit (monetary values).
After the initial calculation by the CIM using equation 2,
peerURate is updated by each peer using equation 7. To
minimize the computation load of the CID, the peerURate
can also be entirely calculated by the peers in a distributed
manner and sent to the CIM every control interval τ . If the
peers send their download rates to the CID and if there is
enough server processing (computation) capacity at the CIM,
all rate computations given by equations 2 and 7 can also be
done by the CIM servers in a centralized manner. In this paper
we use the approach where initial simple rate computation is
done by the CIM servers and the more detailed rate update
computation is done by the peers. The peers then send the
update to the CIM servers.
The peerPrice in our study is per packet cost where one
packet in this study is 1000 Bytes. The peerPrice is initially
set to be the unit content cost plus basic initial user defined
link cost. The content cost is zero for a free content scenario
and the initial link cost in our study is determined by the CIM
system. After the initial cost, peerPrice is calculated adaptively
by the CID servers using equation 4 for each link.
The default content source selection policy we use in this
study is the Highest rate to Price Ratio Policy discussed in
section IV-A. To implement this policy the tblPeer maintains
the peer rate per price peerRatePPrice field.
The amountToPay and amountToEarn fields are updated
by the tblRequestedContent table. A peer gets an additional
amount in dollars for each content it serves and pays a certain
amount for each content it downloads.
2) Content Information Table: The second table the CID
keeps is the content information table which we call tblContent
in this paper. This table contains the fields shown in table III.
The contentSize is used by the CIM to charge the peer
which receives the content. The CID uses this content size
to obtain the per content amount a peer has to pay. The
contentHash is used by the content receiving peer to check
TABLE III
CONTENT INFORMATION TABLE FIELDS
Field name Description
contentID Uniquely identifies content chunk or stream in the CIM
contentDescription A textual description of the content
contentSize Size of the content in KB
contentHash To check for content integrity
contentPopularity The number of times a content with contentID is
requested
for content integrity. Every time a content is selected by a
peer, the popularity of the content increases.
3) Peer-Content Linking Table: This tblPeerContent links
the tblPeer with the tblContent in a many-to-many relation-
ship. To achieve this tblPeerContent consists of the primary
keys peerID and contentID of tblPeer and tblContent tables
respectively. The table also contains the peer specific fields,
contentUrl, contentKey and contentHopCount. The current
location of the content in a peer with peerID is contentUrl.
The source peer encrypts its content with the symmetric key
contentKey. After a peer receives a content from another peer
or from a the original content server, it requests the CID
(tblRequestedContent) for the key to decrypt the content. The
contentHopCount is set to 1 if the peer is the original content
source. Every other peer which receives the content increments
the value of the field by 1. This field along with locality
information for instance helps estimate the streaming content
age since its initial distribution.
4) Selected Source Table: From all the original content
servers and peers which have a specific content, a source for
a requested content is selected based on the content source
selection policy discussed in section IV above. For each
content source selection policy a table called tblSelectedSource
is produced by a query from the tblPeer, tblPeerContent
and tblContent tables. For the Highest Rate to Price Ratio
Policy (HRPR) used in this paper, the tblSelectedSource has
the fields, contentID, peerID, contentDescription, contentUrl,
peerURate, peerPrice peerRatePPrice and contentPopularity.
This table can be sorted in descending order of popularity to
put the most popular contents at the top even though every
content can be looked up in constant time.
5) Requested Content table: The requested content table,
tblRequestedContent, consists of the the fields, contentID,
contentSize, contentSrcID, contentDstID, requestTime, con-
tenOldtKey, contentKey, amountToPay and dlRate. The con-
tentID and contentSize fields correspond to the the requested
content. The contentSrcID field is the peerID of the peer or
server which is selected to serve the content. The contentD-
stID field is the peerID of the content requesting peer. The
field, requesTime is the time when a request for the specific
content was made. The contenOldtKey field is a symmetric
key with which the content was encrypted and by which the
content receiver will decrypt the content. Once a peer with
contentDstID requests for this key to decrypt the content it
downloaded, its amountToPay value is set to the product of
the contentSize and the content duration Dˇ. Here Dˇ is the
difference of the current time (content delivery time) and the
content requestTime. The totalAmountToPay of the peer with
contentDstID and the totalAmountToEarn of the peer or server
with contentSrcID that serves the content each increase by
amountToPay. The contentKey field is a new symmetric key
generated for the content by a specific peer generated by the
CID. The content requesting peer uses this key to encrypt the
content when selected by the CIM to serve the content. Once
the contenOldtKey is successfully received by the peer which
requested the content, and after other tables of contentSrcID
and contentDstID are updated, the record entry of these fields
in tblRequestedContent is deleted. The dlRate field is set to
the minimum of the downlink (to the destination) and uplink
(from the source) rates of the requested content.
In the next section we discuss how the CID tables scale with
the growth in the number of content and peer record entities.
VI. SCALING USER AND TRANSACTION MANAGEMENT
In this section we discuss how ECDP scales to an increase
in the number of users and with the multiple variations in the
request arrival and completion patterns. The CID tables can
be scaled with increasing number of peers and contents by
using multiple data center like servers along with appropriate
hash functions. If the number of servers available for the
tblPeer table is Sp, sigBits(peerID) gives the integral value
corresponding to the most significant bits of the peerID
field. How many significant bits of the peerIDs we take
depends on how many content entries we have. Taking fewer
significant bits for instance means we need fewer servers
(smaller Sp) as more peerIDs can be mapped to a single
server. A record for peerID goes to tblPeer located at server
sigBits(peerID) mod Sp. Here the servers are identified by
positive integral values and mod is the modulo operation. A
record for contentID of peerID goes to tblContent located
at server sigBits(peerID) mod Sp. This ensures that the
content and peer information are located in the same server
for easier local look-up.
Such hashing by sigBits(peerID) helps that content infor-
mation of peers whose IP addresses have the same domain go
to the same server. In this case if a peer in one index server is
selected by the CID as a source of a content to another peer
in the same index server, then the content source selection
strategy becomes local. Such local content source selection
mechanism can help peers achieve low download latency as
the content can be served from another peer in their local
network.
When the request arrival and completion vary so much, the
PA needs to recompute the rate given by equation 7 multiple
times. Furthermore the PA needs to update the rate values at
the respective CIM. Since each CIM obtains temporary rates
using equation 2, the PA does not have to send every update to
the CIM. The PA can send updates every user-defined control
intervals.
Equation 2 used by the CIM only needs one subtraction
(addition) and one division per new flow request arrival or
departure to obtain a temporary uplink rate for each peer. It
also needs one multiplication and one division to obtain the
temporary price given by equation 11. Since the process is
adaptive, some CIM rate and price updates can as well be
skipped as they can be updated by the rate the PA send for each
of their links. The CIMs using equation 2 also do not need to
obtain the temporary downlink rates and prices the downlink
rates and prices can be sent by the content requesting peer.
In these cases the CIM only needs to check if the selected
source has enough remaining upload link capacity to satisfy a
minimum rate requirement M jd,u of the request j.
A. Database Partition and Aggregate
Assigning tblPeer and tblContent tables to different index
servers based on the peer ID (IP) essentially partitions the
CID into multiple local databases. Each local database matches
content source and destination peers located in the same
network domain and local area. We call such content matching
a local content source selection strategy.
If content cannot be found in a local network or if peers
in other local networks can provide a higher upload rate and
lower price, then the source selected to serve a content can
be from a different network domain, different area or even
different country. Such a content source selection strategy
where a content source can be chosen from a different network
domain (area) is called global content source selection.
To achieve global content source selection, the CID needs
to know a source with the highest upload rate and lowest
per packet price for the requested content. The CIM achieves
this by using a map/reduce [21] like framework as shown in
figure 6. For the content source selection strategy we use in
this paper, each local CID database tblPeerContent is sorted in
descending orders by contentPopularity and then peerRateP-
Price for each content. So here we have each tblPeerContent
information mapped to many local index servers (many CIDs).
For each content, a record with the highest peerRatePPrice
among all the tblContent tables in each local CID database is
selected (reduced) into the tblSelectedSource table and placed
in another index server. This is like the reduction phase in the
map/reduce framework where the maximum of is the reduce
function. Each CID continuously sorts the tblPeerContent table
by the peerRatePPrice field for each content with the changes
in the upload rates and prices of the corresponding peer.
If the value of peerRatePPrice field in a tblPeer table
changes, first, each contentID content of the peerID peer in
the tblPeerContent is sorted in descending order of peerRateP-
Price. Then for each content of peerID in the tblSelected-
Source table, if the highest peerRatePPrice of peerID is higher
than the peerRatePPrice of the corresponding content in tblS-
electedSource, then the values of the peerID and peerRateP-
Price fields in the tblSelectedSource table are replaced with
the corresponding values in the tblPeer. The tblSelectedSource
table is sorted by peerID. Hence all contents of the peerID
field are located once the first content of peerID is found. Such
a procedure of constantly updating the tblSelectedSource table
ensures that the table always consists of the list of contents
given by the peers with the highest upload rate and lowest
price (highest rate to price ratio).
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Fig. 6. The CID Partition and Aggregation
B. CID Complexity Analysis
The CID operation of adding new peers to the tblPeer is of
constant order O
(
1
)
as the tblPeer does not have to be sorted
out. Each content in the tblPeerContent has to be sorted out
by peerRatePPrice. Hence adding a new content entry to the
tblPeerContent table has a complexity of order O
(
log(Nc)
)
where Nc is the number of peers which have the same content.
Whenever a peer gets a content that it requested, then
(1) the uplink rate of the content source decreases according
equation 2 and (2) the peer which gets the content becomes
one of the content sources. These two operations require
two O
(
log(Nc)
)
operations for each content. As the tblPeer-
Content in each of the CID partition is sorted, updating the
tblSelectedSource for each of its contents is of constant order.
When tblRequestedContent is updated upon a successful
download of a content by a peer, the corresponding values
of peerRatePPrice and totalAmountToEarn of a source peer
or server and the totalAmountToPay of a receiving peer are
updated in constant time by using the matching peerID field.
In the above sections we have discussed how the bandwidth
rates and prices are calculated and how content and peer
information are managed using databases. We next show how
the rates and prices are enforced so as to increase content
transfer throughput and decrease content transfer delay.
VII. ENFORCING RATE ALLOCATION
When nodes request a certain content, the CIM selects
the content source with the associated uplink rate values. It
also informs the content source of the downlink rate of the
requesting node. With the content source having its uplink
rate and the downlink rate of the receiving node any of the
following schemes can be used by the CIM to enforce the rate
allocation.
A. Enough Backbone Bandwidth
The backbone links in the Internet which the nodes use and
which are represented by the ”Internet” node in figure 2 are
not usually congested as can also be seen from [22]. Each user
of the ECDP mechanism can also have bandwidth service level
agreement from the operators which guarantee the desired
capacity. Under this scenario the only bottleneck links are the
last links to and from the ECDP peer nodes. Hence the sources
of the desired contents can set their congestion window sizes
(cwnd) to the product of their uplink rate value calculated
using equation 8 and their round trip time (RTT) as follows.
First the destination node sets its receive window wir of flow
i as
wir = R
i
d(t)RTT
i. (12)
Then the corresponding source of the flow (stream) i sets
its congestion window wi as
wi = min(w
i
r, R
i
u(t)RTT
i). (13)
B. Scarce Backbone Bandwidth
If the bottleneck link is somewhere in the Internet which is
described as “Internet” node in figure 2, then the destination
of flow i sets its receive window size as given by equation 12.
And the source of flow i sets its maximum congestion window
size wiM as
wiM = R
i
u(t)RTT
i. (14)
A node can detect whether or not the bottleneck is in the
link other than the last links to and from the source and
destination peers using different ways. For instance if a packet
loss is observed for flow i after the rate is enforced using
equation 13, then the TCP source of flow i can assume the
bottleneck link is other than the last links to/from the source
and destination nodes. The PA of the receiving end can also
count the number of received packets (bytes) per unit time
to obtain the actual download rate per content. Similarly the
PA of the content source can also estimate its uplink rate
of a specific content by counting the number of successfully
acknowledged packets (bytes) per unit time. The PA of the
source and destination of the content then report this rate
to the CIM per a specific content. The CIM then replaces
the peerURate of the content in tblSelectedSource with the
minimum of these two values. The source and destination peer
also update their rate calculations using equations 5, 6 and 7
to re-allocate unused capacities to other requests.
C. Packet scheduling
In cases where the requested content is a video stream, the
source of the content can stream its frames by scheduling them
at 1
Riu
apart where Riu is given by equation 8.
D. Peers have no incentive to not obey the ECDP mechanism
In this section we discuss possible misbehaving scenarios
and show that no content source or content destination in
ECDP has an incentive to misbehave. In fact the credit
misbehaving sources earn can be revoked by the CIM.
The first misbehaving scenario is advertising a bandwidth
one does not have. The only reason a peer can advertise higher
uplink bandwidth than it have is to attract more customers
(content requesters). However this mechanism does not result
in higher credit as the credit (monetary amount) is earned
based on the amount of data a source uploads per unit time. If
content source attracts more peers than its bandwidth can han-
dle, then it takes longer to serve each of these requesters. This
results in the peer taking longer to earn its credits. Besides, if
the PA of the peers report the low rate and if the CIM confirms
it using the fields in the tblRequestedContent, the misbehaving
source (a source which advertises a higher than available
bandwidth) gets its credit for a specific content revoked.
The tblRequestedContent of the CID has the requestTime and
contentSize fields. When a peer receives a content, it requests
the CID for the decryption key. The CID of the CIM can then
compare the actualT ime = currentTime − requestTime
against promisedT ime = contentSize / dlRate, where
currentT ime is the time when the request for the decryption
key arrives at the CIM and dlRate is the minimum of the
uplink rate and downlink rate of the requested content. If the
actualT ime > promisedT ime + toleranceV al, then the
CIM via its CM concludes that the source is not uploading
at the rate it suggested. Here toleranceV al is a user-defined
tolerance value.
VIII. ENFORCING PRICES
If a peer chooses a monetary incentive mode of ECDP, it
registers itself at the CIM providing more detailed peerInfo
with which it can be charged or credited. A peer which chooses
a bandwidth incentive mode of ECDP first registers and
accumulates enough credit by downloading popular contents
chosen for him by the CIM. The initial contents which such
peer downloads in the bandwidth incentive mode are randomly
chosen by the CIM to avoid a free loading scenario where
peers download the content they want for free and then
disappear. After the initial content assignment by the CIM,
and after the peer accumulates enough credit to download a
content, then it can download a content it chooses. If peers
are willing to have a pre-paid account or provide information
(like phone numbers or credit card) by which they are held
accountable for the contents they download, they are not
forced to download a content they do not want.
Every peer which downloads a content is charged by the
CIM (its credit balance calculated) as soon as it downloads
the content. The CIM charges the peer when it receives the
peer’s request for the content decryption key. After charging
the peer, the CIM then sends the content decryption key to the
requesting peer.
The next section gives a brief summary of the entire ECDP
protocol which consists of multiple algorithms.
IX. SUMMARY OF THE ECDP PROTOCOL
Initialization steps:
• Each participating peer and CDN server first initializes
its up link and down link base rates to the uplink and
downlink capacities it dedicates to the ECDP system.
• Each participating peer and CDN server also initializes
its unit per packet price (bandwidth) to some value. In
this study the CIM sets the initial per packet bandwidth
prices to the peers and real CDN bandwidth prices used
by the AmazonCLoudFront. Even though we considered
only bandwidth price in this paper, the price may include
other costs such as peer storage, energy, content cost and
other costs.
• Each participating peer and CDN server with a content
then sends these rate and price values along with the
other source and content fields in tblPeer and tblContent
discussed in section V to the CIM.
Content request steps:
• Peer which is interested in a specific content (flow or
stream) sends a content request to the CIM via its peer
agent (PA). The most popular content information can be
displayed by the CIM for other peers to see. Peers can
also lookup the content from the CIM tables.
• CIM first authenticates and registers the requesting peer.
• If no peer has a desired content, the CIM sends the IP
address of a CDN (cloud) server which has the content to
the requesting peer and the IP address of the requesting
peer to the selected CDN server.
• If there is (are) other peers which have a content re-
quested by another peer, the CIM chooses the node (peer
or CDN server) which gives the best metric based on the
content source selection policies discussed in section IV.
• CIM sends the IP of the selected content source along
with the base upload rate and the contentHash field
discussed in section V to the requesting peer.
• CIM sends the base download rate of the requesting node
to the selected source.
• Requesting peer downloads the content from the source
whose IP address it got from the CIM.
• Both content source and destination enforce the rate
allocation as discussed in section VII and VIII.
• Requesting peer gets the contentOldKey from tblRequest-
edContent table discussed in section V to decrypt the
content it downloaded.
CIM update steps:
• CIM records the contentID of the content being down-
loaded by a peer along with the peerID and other fields
discussed in section V into tblPeerContent table.
• CIM calculates the temporary upload and download base
rates of all nodes based on equation 2 and send these new
rates to the PA of each node (peer or server).
• CIM also calculates the temporary per packet price per
uplink and downlink of each node.
• CIM sends the temporary uplink and downlink rate values
to the corresponding PA of each node.
PA update steps:
• PA then recalculates the uplink and downlink base rates
along with the corresponding per packet prices using
equations 7 and 4.
• PA sends the updated rates back to its respective CIM
and the CIM updates its tblPeer table.
We have designed ECDP in such a ways that it can be
deployed in current networks. We next discuss scenarios where
ECDP can be deployed.
X. ECDP DEPLOYMENT SCENARIOS
One of ECDP deployment scenarios is with each peer
using a personal web (content) server similar to the Diaspora
social network. The personal web server can be hosted at a
home server, at a friend server or at an ISP. ECDP can also
be implemented in big content searching companies such as
Google. This can be done by using the CIM to select the best
server to serve a content. For instance when a Google customer
requests for a content, the CIM finds the server with the best
upload rate to the server which is the closest (best metric) to
the customer. The server closer to the customer then caches
the content and content information. So each Google server
which is connected to the Google backbone network can have
a PA which communicates with the CIM for rate and price
updates.
The PA of ECDP can also have CIM like functionality
where a peer (server on behalf of peer) which requests for
a content first checks its local CIM database for a content.
If the content is not located locally then the next level CIM
can be contacted for a content. ECDP can be bootstrapped
by leveraging existing search engines. When a user requests
the CIM for a content and if the CIM cannot find the content
entry in its CID, it then forwards the request to the Bing or
Google search engine. The CIM selects the best search engine
results for the requesting peer. When the peer clicks (selects)
a specific content entry, CIM records that content informa-
tion as being stored in the requesting peer. Next time other
peers request for the same content, the CIM selects the peer
which used the search engine as the content source. This can
gradually lead to a decentralized Internet where contents are
owned by distributed peers and not centralized entities. This
can significantly decrease the backbone bandwidth congestion
as more contents can be served in local networks.
Once users maintain content ownership, they can host
controlled and paid advertisements (ads) in their personal web
servers based on the popularity, freshness and other metric
values of the content. If a content is infested with too much
paid ads, other peers will select a content source with less or
no ads. This can help control the number of ads peers want
to make money from. The CIM can also have its own policy
on the nature of contents and ads. Such a distributed nature
of content distribution can also result in a reduced cost of
advertisements as there is more competition due to popular
contents being owned by more people in the distributed
network. Hence as more users (customers) get efficient and
fair incentives to participate in the content distribution, content
providers, network operators and advertisers can also benefit
greatly. Such a scheme where all players benefit is a stable
and sustainable system.
We have performed detailed experimental analysis to eval-
uate the performance of ECDP as shown in the next section.
XI. EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the performance of ECDP and all
its components using simulation and real world experiments.
For the simulation, we implemented ECDP in the NS2 sim-
ulation and for the real experiments we implemented ECDP
using Apache SQL server [23] to manage the content indices.
A. Simulation Setup
We use a simulation topology similar to the one given in fig-
ure 2. For the simulation the upload and download capacities
of the links to and from the peers is 15Mbps. The link capacity
to and from the CDN is npeers × 15Mbps, where npeers
is the number of peers. The propagation delay between the
peers is taken from 4 hour PlanetLab traces [24]. The average
CDN bandwidth price taken from the Amazon CloudFront
[25] is avg cdnPrice = $0.176 per GB of traffic. The initial
peer bandwidth price is avg cdnPrice/(2.0 × npeers). This
price adaptively increases as the peer rate decreases with
more demands based on equation 4. We run different sets of
experiments as shown in the following sections.
B. Pure CDN Vs ECDP-Based Schemes
Figure 7 shows how the ECDP-based scheme scales with the
growing number of content requesting peers when compared
with the pure CDN-based approach. This result is consistent
with detailed study [10] which shows that the hybrid CDN-
P2P can significantly reduce the cost of content distribution
bandwidth.
C. Pricing Evaluation
Figures 8 shows that the monetary amount spent per GB
of traffic using the ECDP peering is much smaller than
the fixed per GB traffic cost using the cloud CDN. The
figure also demonstrates the theory behind the ECDP pricing
mechanism. The few price spikes in the ECDP result when
the peers download the content from the CDN cloud. This
happens either because the content from the peers is too old
as discussed in section III-D or none of the peers have a
content source selection metric higher than that of the CDN
servers based on the HRPR policy. The content provider can
subsidize this bandwidth price (cover the extra bandwidth
expense) as such peers which download the content directly
from the source act as content seeders.
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Fig. 7. Pure CDN Versus ECDP-based Approach
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As shown in figure 9 most of the peers do not have to pay
an extra bandwidth amount to download a content as the credit
amount they earn balances out the debit they incur.
D. Other P2P schemes Vs ECDP
We have also compared the performance of ECDP against
other hybrid P2P and CDN schemes in terms of average
chunk completion time (ACCT). Previous hybrid P2P and
CDN schemes such as the Dandelion [8], PACE [14] use TCP
as their transport protocol. So we show how these schemes
using TCP compare against ECDP by fixing the content source
selection mechanism to be the same for both.
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For this experiment we use 8 files with content i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 8
is with file size 500i KB and chunk size i is 50i KB. Inter-
content chunk time is 0.5 seconds. All contents are requested
at the same time. Each file (content) is divided into equal
chunks. Content popularity is 5 for each of the contents. For
the TCP-based and the ECDP approaches content destination
and source are the same. For these experiments we set the
minimum flow rate to 0.0 and all chunks have the same priority
levels.
Figure 10 shows that the completion time of small chunks
is much smaller in ECDP than the pure TCP-based approaches
(PACE, Dandelion) without affecting the CCT of bigger
chunks.
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E. 3D Streaming Result
For the 3D streaming experiments, we use a setup which
emulates [3] with 6 streams. Each stream demands a minimum
of 1Mbps capacity. Each stream i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 6 has a priority
weight of 1/i. We used a content lifetime of 2.5 seconds for
the streaming. So if a stream at a peer is older than 2.5 seconds,
the CIM does not register the peer as having the content.
Figures 11 and 12 demonstrate the priority and minimum
rate mechanisms of ECDP. As shown in the figure, stream 1
which has the highest priority weight gets highest throughput.
The throughput of the other streams follows their priority
weights.
Figures 13 and 14 also show how the Instantaneous through-
put of the different streams evolve with time. All these plots
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show how efficiently ECDP enforces the priority based rate
allocations.
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F. More Trace-Based Experiments
We have also conducted experiments based on the trace
results presented in [26] for the content size distribution, [27]
for the content popularity distribution and [28] for distribution
of the flow arrival process. Since we could not obtain the
raw trace data, we constructed the trace values (data points)
from the plots given in these papers. We next present the trace
extraction methodologies we used.
1) Extracting file size distribution: Based on the nature
of the file size trace plot of US-Campus given in figure 4
of [26], we constructed piece-wise linear functions given by
equation 15.
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FS =


u(1, 5), cdf <= 0.17,
10−5
0.18−0.17
(u(0, 1) − 0.17) + 5.0, 0.17 < cdf ≤ 0.18,
200−10
0.204−0.18
(u(0, 1) − 0.18) + 10, 0.18 < cdf ≤ 0.204,
1000−200
0.25−0.204
(u(0, 1) − 0.204) + 200, 0.204 < cdf ≤ 0.25,
30000−1000
0.96−0.25
(u(0, 1) − 0.25) + 1000, 0.25 < cdf ≤ 0.96,
70000−30000
0.99−0.96
(u(0, 1) − 0.96) + 30000, 0.96 < cdf ≤ 0.99,
100000−70000
1.0−0.99
(u(0, 1) − 0.99) + 70000, 0.99 < cdf ≤ 1.0.
(15)
In equation 15, the function u(a, b) generates a uniform
random number between a and b and cdf is the CDF of the
file size trace plot.
2) Extracting content popularity distribution: A Gamma
distribution curve with a shape parameter of k˜ = 0.372 and
a scale parameter of θ = 23910 is fitted to Youtube video
content popularity distribution traces in figure 7 of [27]. The
content popularity distribution in the paper which refers to the
number of views of videos considers about NV = 1.6 × 105
videos. We normalized the scale parameter θ of the distribution
by the number NV of distinct videos so as to use it with
simulation studies involving a different number of videos. The
normalization steps are as follows.
With nv the total number of video flows to be simulated,
and pv the average popularity of the videos, nvpv is the total
number of videos to be simulated. With a simulation time of
ts seconds and average video request arrival rate of λs flows
per second, we have
nv =
tsλs
pv
. (16)
To obtain pv , we normalize the number NV of traced videos
by the mean k˜θ of the Gamma popularity distribution as
nv
pv
=
NV
k˜θ
. (17)
Combining equations 16 and 17, we get the popularity value
as
pv =
√
k˜θtsλs
NV
. (18)
Using equation 18 in equation 16 we also obtain the number
of distinct videos in the simulation.
3) Flow arrival distribution: We used the distribution of
the number of flow arrivals per second given in [28] for
our simulation. The paper fits a Poisson distributed curve to
the trace and hence we used such a Poisson distribution for
our flow arrival distribution. The number of YouTube servers
(servers with unique IP addresses) used in the experiment was
2138. To scale our simulation we considered arrival rates to
1 and 10 servers. The experiment can simply be run for all
servers with powerful machines.
4) More Trace Experimental Results: To compare the per-
formance of pure ECDP based approach against other TCP
based approaches, we considered the best case scenario for the
TCP based approaches. This scenario uses the ECDP content
selection mechanism. So using this same server selection
mechanism we compared the performance of the TCP-based
approaches (PACE, Dandelion) with our pure ECDP based
approach. As can be seen from figures 15, 16 and 17, the pure
ECDP approach gives lower file completion time when com-
pared with TCP-based ECDP approach. For all experiments in
this section, each YouTube file is divided into 50 chunks. So
bigger file sizes have bigger chunk sizes. The YouTube video
files we consider in this analysis are not live videos. Hence
we use a content age of 15.5 seconds. This implies that videos
which were first requested less than 15.5 seconds ago can still
be requested. For all experiments of one YouTube server, the
machine we used allowed us to run the simulation for 120
seconds. For the 10 YouTube servers experiments, we used a
simulation time of 30 seconds.
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Figure 16 shows the average file completion time (AFCT)
of files less than 4000KB in size while figure 15 shows FCT
of all files. As can be seen from figure 17, with more YouTube
servers, the number of simulated peers requesting for content
increases. This inturn increases the number of peers with a
content and hence decreasing the file download time (AFCT).
This is one of the noble gains of peer to peer systems as more
peers means more bandwidth.
Figures 17, 20 and 19 show that overwhelming majority of
the peers do not have to spend money to download GB of data
as the credit amount they earn balances out with the amount
they pay. For each peer, the amount to spend in these plots is
calculated as the total amount of money a peer earns minus
the total amount a peer has to pay per GB of content.
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Fig. 19. Net amount to pay in dollars per GB of downloaded content with
10 YouTube servers (First few peers)
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Comparing figures 17 and 20, it can be seen that more
YouTube servers in the experiment means more participating
peers. The more peers have the contents the less other peers
have to download the content from the CDN servers. This
saves peers more money as can be seen from the plots. In
all cases, the amount peers pay for bandwidth to download
a content is less than the fixed CDN bandwidth amount
charged by AmazonCLoudFront. For the experiments with
only one YouTube server, the simulation generates fewer peers
to download the content. As the number of peers which have
the content is smaller, more peers download contents from the
CDN servers paying more money as can be seen in figure 17.
The amount which peers pay to directly download a content
from the CDN servers can be subsidized (paid for) by the
content providers as such peers are serving as seeders for the
content provider.
G. CID Implementation Experiments
We have also implemented the basic features of ECDP in an
Apache SQL server using PHP script. We implemented all the
tables of the CID in an Ubuntu virtual machine using a quad
four processor and a 1GB RAM. We generated tblSelected-
Source table using a SELECT query from the tables tblPeer,
tblContent, tblPeerContent as discussed in section V-A4 above.
The tables are linked in a many-to-many relationship.
To see the performance gain of using the tblSelectedSource
table over generating the contents requested by peers on the fly
from the three tables, we have conducted experiments using
and not using the tblSelectedSource table. We used one million
records in each table for this experiment. As can be seen from
figures 21 and 22 preparing the tblSelectedSource table as its
source tables are updated results in significant gain in query
time. Here, query time is the time from when a query for a
specific record is made to when the reply is displayed from the
SQL server. In these experiments we first generated uniform
random content index records with the given contentIDs to
request from the SQL server. The content with the ID of
cont396224 was the first content requested. Such initial request
of a record resulted in a higher query time perhaps because
the SQL server took time to upload parts of the table into
memory. Figure 22 also shows that the query time increases
with the increase in the record ID. This is because the tables
are roughly sorted by requestIDs as the none-numeric parts
of the contentID and peerID values are the same while both
fields have text data types.
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The SQL query we made from the tblSelectedSource for the
content with contentID of cont396224 is as follows.
SELECT *
FROM ‘tblSelectedSource‘
WHERE contentID = ’cont396224’
LIMIT 0 , 1
And the following is the query we made from the three
tables.
SELECT tblPeerContent.contentID, tblPeerContent.peerID,
tblPeerContent.contentUrl, tblPeerContent.contentKey,
tblContent.contentDesc, tblContent.contentPopularity,
tblPeer.peerURate, tblPeer.peerUPrice, tblPeer.ratePerPrice
FROM tblPeerContent
INNER JOIN tblPeer ON tblPeerContent.peerID = tblPeer.peerID
INNER JOIN tblContent
ON tblPeerContent.contentID = tblContent.contentID
WHERE tblPeerContent.contentID = ’cont396224’
LIMIT 0 , 1
We next conducted an experiment to know how long it
takes for a query such as requesting the contentKey by a peer
from the CID of the CIM. The propagation delay from the
requesting peer virtual machine to the virtual machine with
the SQL server is about 1ms. The times it takes for such
query is shown in figure 23. There is a spike on the record of
cont132913 which is the first record requested by the peer
in the experiment. Such a spike disappears with the other
requested records as perhaps the SQL server caches the session
and keeps the tblRequestedContent table loaded in memory.
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The query we used for the experiments in figure 23 is as
follows.
SELECT * FROM tblRequestedContent
WHERE contentID = ’cont$value’
LIMIT 0,1
These above query time figures are intended to show that
the time it takes to resolve a certain query is not high even
using a computer (server) with very limited hardward such as
an Ubuntu virtual machine.
XII. RELATED WORK
Over time, Peer-to-peer (P2P) content distribution has
evolved to incorprate incentives in order to prevent freeload-
ing. The BitTorrent [11], [12] uses a rate based tit-for-tat
mechanism where users can achive higher download rate from
peers to which they are uploading. In this case a peer which
is not downloading a content is not incentivized to upload
a content. In ECDP all peers are incentivized to continue
uploading as every upload increases their credit maintained
by the ECDP CIM. Reputation based schemes such as [29]
help peers find another peer with the highest reputation score
to download content from. Such a reputaiton scheme does not
provide an accurate evaluation mechanism to choose a peer to
serve a content. For instance a peer which is uploading many
files without downloading a file can have a high reputation
score. If such a peer does not have as much available upload
capacity as another peer which is downloading files, peers will
select it anyways becuase it has a high reputation score.
In the KARMA [30] scheme every peer has a set of man-
agers which form banks which coordinate credit transfer with
other peers. In this scheme there is no guarantee of integrity
of the global currency when the majority of the managers
are malicious. In ECDP a central CIM which cannot be
manipulated by peers offers real monetary rewards to all peers
which upload contents. PACE [14] uses bandwidth pricing to
help uploading peers earn credit. However PACE does not
give a fair-exchange of content for payment as the content
demand at a peer is estimated as a total requested download
rate at remote buy clients. Such demand used to obtain a
bandwidth price is not peer specific. Dandelion [8] is based on
a centralized online currency bank mechanism to incentivize
peers. However Dandelion uses a fixed pricing mechanism that
peers are not awarded according to the upload bandwidth they
offer to upload contents. Peers do not decrease their price
to attract more customers when they have high upload rate
and viceversa. PRIME [31] is a mesh-based P2P streaming.
Eventhough it tries to balance the average outgoing rate of
a source peer with the average incoming rate of a content
receiving peer, it does not use an efficient rate allocation
and enforcement mechanism like ECDP to achieve a max/min
allocation. It uses a TCP friendly rate control protocol (TFRC)
[32] which inherits the TCP problems of not quickly utiliz-
ing avaialable link capacities. In PRIME each peer tries to
maintain many parents that can collectively serve as content
providers using a mesh-based overlay constraction which can
potentially incure significant overhead. Unlike ECDP, PRIME
does not give an efficient mechanisim to help peers select a
content source with high throughput and minimum bandwidth
cost. This is because a new peer selects a random subset of
peers to be its content parents. A reliable client accounting
system of a commercial hybrid content-distribution network
(Akamai) is also presented in [33] to detect and mitigate
a variety of attacks by malicious peers. This mechanisim
improves the NetSession which is a peer-assisted content
delivery network (CDN) operated by Akamai. In ECDP peers
do have any incentive to act maliciously. This is because peers
get monetary incentives (credit) for uploading content and all
transactions are co-ordinated by a scalable centralized ECDP
CIM. If an ECDP peer acts maliciously, it only wastes its
bandwidth and suffers monetary losses.
A hybrid CDN-P2P system for live video streaming called
LiveSky is presented in [7]. The paper gives a trace based
study of extensive LiveSky deployment in China. However
the work only gives approximate guideline for peer selection.
For instance the paper assume that the total upload bandwidth
of clients in level k of the P2P tree is always larger than the
download bandwidth requirement of clients in level k+1. It
also only considers aggregate measures (i.e., population and
time averages) to model the end-user properties. On the other
hand ECDP does not make such assumptions and uses accurate
rate and price based incentives to select content sources
to serve a content. This gives peers a reliable incentive to
cooperate without a malice. LiveSky also limits peer selection
to a local network while ECDP does not make that ristriction
unless local content source selection stragy is used or the
local peers have the best upload rate and lowest prices. A
study in [34] shows that redirecting every client to the CDN
server with least latency does not suffice to optimize client
latencies. The authors of this paper proposed a system called
WhyHigh to optimize Google CDN perfomance. WhyHigh
measures client latencies across all nodes in the CDN and
correlates measurements to identify the prefixes affected by
inflated latencies. ECDP by design chooses peers or CDN
servers which offer the highest throughput and lowest price
and does not require complex in efficient systems such as
WhyHigh to select content sources.
NetTube, a P2P assisted content delivering framework that
explores the clustering in social networks for short video
sharing is proposed in [35]. Like NetTube, ECDP allows users
to share their contents while keeping it in their own servers.
Unlike ECDP, NetTube selects a content source based on
social groups and not based on throughput and bandwidth
price. SocialTube, which is peer-assisted video sharing sys-
tem that explores social relationship, interest similarity, and
physical location between peers in online social networks
(OSNs) is proposed in [36]. SocialTube uses a social network
(SN)-based P2P overlay construction algorithm. Unlike ECDP,
SocialTube does not select content sources based on a high
upload bandwidth and low cost. This can result in SocialTube
unnecessarily delaying streaming and other content transfer
when other peers not in the same social group with high upload
capacity exist.
Besides, unlike ECDP, all the above schemes do not help
peers determine an accurate rate at which they can download
content from other peers. They do not give a mechanism to
prioritize content transfers which is an important component
of 3D [20] and other streaming applications. Unlike ECDP
they also do not provide an efficient max/min rate allocation
mechanisim.
XIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed the design of an efficient content
distribution protocol (ECDP). Unlike previous distributed con-
tent distribution attempts, ECDP relies on an accurate and fair
incentive mechanism which allows prioritized rate allocations
and enforcements. ECDP is a flexible scheme which allows
multiple server selection strategies and can achieve max/min
allocation. Unlike previous work we have presented a noble
content index management scheme for ECDP.
We have implemented ECDP in the NS2 simualation pack-
age. We evaluated the performance of ECDP using rigurous
trace based simulation experiments. The experiments demon-
strate the ECDP design goals of allocations and enforcements.
We have also implemented ECDP in Apache SQL server
using PHP in Ubuntu virtual machines. The implementation
experiments show that ECDP can easily scale to millions of
content index records. We have also shown how ECDP can be
deployed in the current Internet architecture with siginificant
gains.
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